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Abstract
A strategic approach is now being taken towards EU-Japan 
cooperation in the field of politics, development, strategy 
and security. Despite diverse political and administrative cul-
tures that have slowed the process, it is moving forward. 
COVID19 and the impossibility of meeting face to face has 
impaired communication but, at the same time, provisions 
to cope with the negative economic impact of the virus have 
led to record high government budgets and stimulus packag-
es. Financial resources that can be used for new Japanese 
and EU projects and ideas are thus available. A Partnership 
on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure was 
signed between the EU and Japan in September 2019. This 
Partnership Agreement, which is also designed to encour-
age projects in other countries, covers sectors from trans-
port and energy to digital industries. It calls for ‘transpar-
ent procurement practises, assurance of debt sustainability 
and high standards of economic, fiscal, financial, social and 
environmental sustainability’. Coupled with ODA (Official 
Development Assistance), which would be necessary for 
its implementation in the developing world, this partnership 
can make a difference. Our paper will begin by presenting 
a short historical background of EU-Japan relations. This 
will be followed by an account of the development of recent 
years and finally, by a focus on the Partnership on Sustain-
able Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure. The meaning of 
Infrastructure Connectivity both for EU and Japan, as well 
as for China, will be analysed. Then we will venture into the 
implementation phase of the Partnership and finally we will 
offer policy advice.
 EU-Asia project
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A strategic approach is now being taken towards 
EU-Japan cooperation in the fields of politics, 
development, strategy and security. Despite di-
verse political and administrative cultures that 
have slowed the process, it is moving forward. 
COVID19 and the impossibility of meeting face 
to face has impaired communication but gener-
ous economic stimulation packages should help 
allay the difficulties this created. In addition, the 
Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and 
Quality Infrastructure was signed between the EU 
and Japan in September 2019. This Partnership 
Agreement, also designed to encourage projects 
in third countries, covers sectors from transport to 
digital industries. It calls for ‘transparent procure-
ment practises, assurance of debt sustainability 
and the high standards of economic, fiscal, finan-
cial, social and environmental sustainability’. Cou-
pled with ODA (Official Development Assistance), 
which would be necessary for its implementation 
in the developing world, this partnership can make 
a difference. 
There are several forces driving the process of 
further EU-Japan cooperation. One has to do with 
geopolitical changes and the rise of China. While 
the EU-Japan partnership agreement does not 
mention China by name, it is clearly crafted with 
Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in mind. This gi-
ant Chinese project has been endorsed by more 
than 150 countries, including more than half of the 
27 EU member states. The need for infrastructure, 
in Asia in particular, is huge: required develop-
ment funds are estimated to reach US$6 trillion by 
2030. Chinese contribution is welcome but there 
is a fear among traditional donors that it may not 
be offered in a fair way and with transparency. The 
EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectiv-
ity and Quality Infrastructure is an attempt to rem-
edy that and to provide an alternative source of 
financing.
A second reason for EU-Japan cooperation is the 
decline of liberalism on a worldwide basis. With 
the outcome of Brexit and the refugee crises in 
Europe, liberal world order is being questioned. 
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to great-
er concerns regarding security. This is coupled 
with a weakening role for the US. Former Presi-




dent Donald Trump’s policy of ‘America first’ fur-
ther challenged the liberal world order. America’s 
two main liberal partners (the EU and Japan) were 
made aware that multilateralism was no longer a 
priority. In fact, these regions remained the two 
main powers left to defend the liberal world or-
der. With the Biden administration now in place, 
there has been a reversal that implies more co-
operation from the US. President Joe Biden has 
announced that the US will join the Paris (Climate) 
Agreement. Yet it is becoming more unlikely that 
the country will rejoin the Iran nuclear deal. At the 
Munich security conference on transatlantic rela-
tions in Feb 19, 2021 Biden strongly emphasised 
that ‘America is back’1 Although this was highly 
appreciated, by both the German Chancellor An-
gela Merkel and the French president Emmanu-
el Macron, neither leader seems to view this as 
a solution to the world’s problems: they seem to 
have learnt a lesson from the years with Trump. 
The world has changed, and the US might have 
different priorities, as President Macron put it.2
The fact is that the US might have a hard time 
of getting back again. A geopolitical power shift is 
ongoing; last year China overtook the US as Eu-
rope’s largest trading partner.3 The EU and China 
have recently concluded, in principle, the negotia-
tions for a Comprehensive Agreement on Invest-
ment (CAI). Recent figures also show that China is 
now the country that receives most foreign direct 
investment.4 The Chinese economy was the only 
major economy that showed substantial growth 
during 2020. 
Besides all the death and human suffering caused 
by COVID19, measures to ensure it does not 
spread further mean profound changes to the 
way we live our lives and how business and the 
international order is set up. An effective response 
to COVID19 requires multilateral actions. It has 
caused severe reduction to travel, communication 
and trade as countries have closed their borders 
to prevent the virus from spreading. EU and Japa-
nese companies have seen distortion to their sup-
ply chains and are hedging against such negative 
alterations in the future. But it is not only the com-
panies experiencing difficulties. The EU and Jap-
anese governments seem to be hedging against 
distortions in other fields. The current pandemic 
strengthens the political motivation for cooper-
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ation between the EU and Japan. They share a 
mutual goal of promoting a liberal world order built 
on values such as transparency, sustainability, de-
mocracy and human rights. Collaboration is likely 
to increase between the EU and Japan on a multi-
lateral level and when third countries are involved. 
There are also security reasons for working to-
gether. Neither Japan nor the EU want to let an 
intensely powerful China dominate world affairs, 
nor do they want to be caught up in a US trade 
confrontation with China, nor find that Russia is 
teaming up with China. European countries and 
Japan are, of course, heavily dependent on the 
US in the field of security but, at the same time, 
they are not likely to accept a system of US divide 
and rule. In the future they will probably hedge 
their bets. 
After decades of talk about cooperation, it seems 
that the EU and Japan have finally begun to initi-
ate concrete actions. This paper will give an ac-
count of developments in recent years, including 
the conclusion of an Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (EPA), a Strategic Partnership Agreement 
(SPA) and finally, the Partnership on Sustain-
able Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure. The 
meaning of Connectivity for EU and Japan will be 
analysed, as well as what this concept means for 
China. The strategic cooperative approach taken 
by the EU and Japan today will be presented. Fi-
nally, advice will be given on an effective imple-
mentation, one that will make a difference.
Historical background to EU-Japan 
relations
Following defeat in 1945 Japan became an oc-
cupied country. A program of ‘demilitarization’ 
and ‘democratization’ was initiated by SCAP (the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). Al-
though the Occupation was termed ‘Allied’, Eu-
ropean leaders took little interest in Japanese af-
fairs since most of the running of SCAP was in 
the hands of the American military. At the time Eu-
ropean countries also had more pressing issues 
to contend with, such as economic collapse and 
identity crises at home. The US came to play an 
important role in the rebuilding, not only of Japan 
but also of parts of Europe.
Diplomatic relations were resumed between Ja-
pan and various West European countries when 
Japan gained independence in 1952, but US dom-
inance impeded any form of substantive bilateral 
dialogue. Only with the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the Cold War were political relations 
ready to take off. The Hague Declaration of 1991 
led to the initiation of policy dialogues between 
Japan and the EC and relations became institu-
tionalised, with regular official political dialogue at 
various levels and covering a range of issues. 
For much of the Cold War period China was not 
a central player in global politics. Largely isolat-
ed from the Western world by the US policy of 
non-recognition (including no economic contact), 
China did not fundamentally affect the EU or even 
Japan. The main communist threat felt by both 
Japan and the EU was from the Soviet Union. 
China’s international role, and its impact became 
more salient with Nixon’s announcement in 1971 
that he would go to China. This was quickly fol-
lowed by a Japanese agreement with Beijing to 
normalise relations (1972). Nonetheless, China 
remained an extremely weak economic power, 
with nearly 25 per cent of the world’s population, 
but only just over 2 per cent of global GDP. Market 
reforms and opening to global trade and invest-
ment began to transform China from the end of 
the 1970s, leading to the country’s rise, first as a 
regional, and then as a global economic power.
Following its admission to the WTO in 2001, Chi-
na became an important issue in EU–Japan and 
even trans-Atlantic relations for the first time by 
2004. China was identified by the EU as a stra-
tegic partner in 2003. Yet EU proposals to lift the 
arms embargo imposed on China in the wake of 
the Tiananmen Square incident, provoked Japa-
nese and US opposition. By 2010, China overtook 
Japan to become the world’s second largest econ-
omy. China’s rise posed a distinctive challenge to 
the liberal international order led by the US and 
supported by the EU and Japan, due to the coun-
try’s presence as a largely non-liberal power with 
an authoritarian political system. Today’s so-called 
‘Beijing Consensus’ sees China promoting a mod-
el of authoritarian-led economic development, 
challenging Western models. China’s economic 
rise arguably helped to undermine the fortunes of 
working classes in Western countries, while the 
country’s political rise itself seemed to challenge 
more generally the dominance of the Western lib-
eral order and liberalism as promoted by the US, 
the EU, and Japan.
China’s rise thus appears to be one factor driving 
the spread of illiberalism globally and even within 
the Western world, where growing domestic eco-
nomic inequalities are increasing. The influence of 
an illiberal and revanchist Russia, plus other fac-
tors such as technological change; massive refu-
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gee flows created by the Arab Spring, especially 
the civil war in Syria; the rise of radical politicised 
Islam, and perhaps even the balkanising effects of 
the spread of social media on news and the lack of 
objective recognition of facts, have all contributed 
to the decline of liberalism. This spread of illiberal-
ism is a challenge facing the EU and Japan alike. 
Even inside the EU and Japan we can see the 
potentially menacing growth of illiberalism. 
In the US, still the global liberal hegemon, we also 
see the rise of illiberalism. This phenomenon had 
already began in the first few years of the 21st 
century, well before the political rise of Donald 
Trump. The decline of human rights included a 
willingness to engage in torture, indefinite deten-
tion of suspects without trial, increasing surveil-
lance of citizens and a disregard for international 
institutions. 
Signing an Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) and a binding Strategic Partnership Agree-
ment (SPA) in 2018, the EU and Japan planned 
to lead developments back to a fuller liberal or-
der. The fact that the two managed to conclude a 
free trade agreement covering 30 percent of the 
world’s GDP is partly a result of the changing pow-
er structure in the 21st century. The EPA provides 
the basis for streamlining conditions for a fair and 
free trade policy and signals a commitment to that. 
The SPA, signed at the same time, does not have 
a firm roadmap. It is underpinned by shared val-
ues and principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Based 
on the principles of mutual respect, equal partner-
ship and respect for international law, Japan, EU 
and the Member States have agreed to cooperate 
in and coordinate policies in more than 40 differ-
ent areas. A Joint Committee has been assigned 
to supervise the implementation of this. 
The move in 2015 from the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGS) has changed the perception 
of what development cooperation should look 
like. More than ten times as much money will be 
needed to achieve the SDGs. Meanwhile the con-
tribution of Official Development Assistance (gov-
ernment aid) as a percentage of total flows to de-
veloping countries is shrinking. Private institutions 
and business are now being actively encouraged 
to assist with funding. Development cooperation 
is no longer only about poverty reduction but also 
5  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342065144 or https://www.southeastasianstudies.uni-freiburg.de/documents/occasional-paper/
op45.pdf
about climate change, descent work and econom-
ic growth, clean water, affordable and clean en-
ergy and development of industry, innovation and 
infrastructure. It has also become a political tool, 
used for security reasons. Both the EU and Japan 
are champions of development cooperation. They 
have the financial resources as well as knowledge 
to assist other countries, both for humanitarian 
reasons and for their own sake. 
The Partnership on Sustainable 
Connectivity and Quality 
Infrastructure
Connectivity is not politically neutral, and this 
agreement is part of an effort by both (EU and 
Japan) to revive multilateralism. Sustainable con-
nectivity has become a buzz word in EU politics 
and quality infrastructure is something that Ja-
pan has been heavily promoting. Let us consider 
whether these concepts mean the same thing for 
both.
In a paper titled ‘Learning from the Competition 
- China's, Japan's and the EU's Infrastructure 
Connectivity Rule Setting in Asia’5 authors Caixia 
Mao and Lukas Maximilian Müller compare Chi-
na, Japan and EU development assistance on 
infrastructure connectivity based on the following 
dimensions: (1) the breadth of their infrastructure 
support (2) the comparative advantage the sup-
port is based on; (3) the character of resources 
provided; and (4) the degree of bilateralism/multi-
lateralism. What emerges are three quite distinct 
ways of seeing infrastructure connectivity.
The authors conclude that the Chinese perspec-
tive lacks clarity and has a ‘win-win’; basis for 
economic prosperity, the Japanese perspective 
defines it as international public good and a basis 
for economic prosperity and the EU perspective 
views it as sustainable infrastructure, emphasis-
ing physical links as the basis for economic pros-
perity. The comparative advantages are also very 
different. China, with its own development experi-
ence and rapid build-up of physical links, has flexi-
bility and pragmatism as well as financial, material 
and labour resources. Japan, with technological 
leadership, has economic efficiency and low life-
cycle costs and represents operational safety, re-
silience against natural disasters, consideration of 
environmental and social impacts as well as high 
contribution to local society and economy. The 
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EU’s comparative advantage is common market 
experience, multi-modal transport networks and 
environmental and social sustainability. Concern-
ing the character of resources, the Chinese ap-
proach is state-led, encompassing financial and 
labour resources, the Japanese approach is pri-
vate sector-driven, encompassing financial and 
technological aspects and the EU approach is 
also private sector led, often encompassing tech-
nical cooperation and regional-level cooperation. 
Multilateralism featured more prominently in Ja-
pan and in the EU, although the Chinese pattern 
is moving in this direction.
This comparison clearly shows that infrastructure 
connectivity can mean different things. Though 
more closely aligned, EU and Japanese visions 
are not necessarily the same either, which is like-
ly to lead to different priorities for projects, when 
it comes to type and geographical location. This 
may well cause challenges for further cooperation. 
The EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Con-
nectivity and Quality Infrastructure, however is a 
wider concept that not only covers physical infra-
structure but cuts across all aspects of living con-
ditions. There are four basic fields:
• Diversified trade and travel routes linking ex-
isting and future transport networks. In Japan, 
this is referred to as quality infrastructure de-
velopment. Strategic investment in critical 
infrastructure creates economic and political 
interdependencies, both hard and soft ones.
• Energy platforms, interconnected regionally, 
modern energy systems and environmentally 
friendly solutions.
• Digital -Increased access to digital services 
that maintain a high level of protection of con-
sumer and personal data.
• Human dimension-advanced cooperation in 
education, research innovation, culture and 
tourism.
The need for infrastructure regarding trade and 
travel transport, in Asia in particular, is huge. Chi-
nese contribution is welcome but there is a fear 
among traditional donors that it may not be of-
fered in a fair way and without transparency, as 
mentioned earlier. On the second point, energy 
platforms and environmentally-friendly solutions 
are fields of great interest to the EU (with its new 
Green Deal) and Japan. Both regions signed the 
Paris (climate) Agreement and have adhered to it. 
Digital cooperation, which encompasses a num-
ber of regulatory reforms, is on its way but there 
are hurdles that still must be passed to exchange 
as well as protect data on both company and per-
sonal levels. The prevention of free movement 
of people due to the COVID 19 has made digital 
connection all the more important. In the human 
dimension the virus and attempts to control its 
spread demonstrate that there must be multilat-
eral solutions to solve health issues. The virus is 
creating a lot of human suffering. A global vaccine 
might lessen suffering but COVID 19 has already 
brought big changes and our societies are not 
likely to go back to the way they formerly func-
tioned before the crisis. The world is changing and 
the question is how to move forward. The EU and 
Japan share the same liberal values; they are co-
operating to build a sustainable future world.
The EU is stongly advocating cooperation with 
Asia in the field of sustainable connectivity. This 
connectivity and infrastructure drive is part of a 
wider push by the EU to transform itself from ‘pay-
er to player,’ where trade, aid, and investments 
should be used together to achieve strategic for-
eign policy goals. This involves EU plans to de-
ploy 60 billion euros to leverage investment many 
times that value in order to improve ties between 
Europe and Asia. Quality infrastructure was a 
concept launched by Japan, partly to distinguish 
its foreign development cooperation actions from 
China´s infrastructure drive. The EU-Japan Part-
nership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality 
Infrastructure Agreement combines the aspira-
tions of both the EU and Japan. It was signed in 
Brussels on 27 September 2019. One day before 
this, a cooperation agreement was signed be-
tween the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 
Such agreements between the EIB and the Japan 
Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), as well 
as with Nippon Export and Investment Insurance 
were already in place before the explosive out-
break of COVID 19. 
Infrastructure connectivity at 
Present 
Since March 2020 COVID-19 has dominated the 
news and the political scene both in EU and Ja-
pan. In spite of this unrest EU-Japan political and 
strategical cooperation has been ongoing, under 
the radar. Development Cooperation is one such 
area. As mentioned above, a move from the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) was adopted 
by all UN members in 2015. There are new goals, 
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leading to a new aid architecture or rather, an in-
ternational partnership architecture which implies 
wider and deeper cooperation with non members 
of OECDs Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and with other sources such as private in-
dustry and various NGOs.
Japan used to be considered the odd man out in 
development cooperation. Although it has been a 
DAC member since the start of that organisation 
in 1964 and, during the 1990s, was the world’s 
largest donor of Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA), Japanese aid approach has always 
been a bit different from other DAC donors in the 
heavy emphasis on economic infrastructure and 
loan aid. Due to the shift from the MDGs to the 
SDGs many other donors, including the EU, are 
now following in Japan’s footsteps. This implies 
an emphasis on economic infrastructure: building, 
roads railways and ports, categorised as transport 
in the EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Con-
nectivity and Quality Infrastructure. Historically, 
Japanese assistance has close cooperation with 
Japanese private companies, a fact which has 
not been well-regarded by other DAC donors, but 
is now promoted because such huge sums are 
needed to achieve the SDGs. There is a yearly 
Development Dialogue ongoing between EU and 
Japan. In February 2021 they listed examples to 
illustrate Japan-EU synergies and complementar-
ity on sustainable connectivity and quality infra-
structure. This became quite a long list (see box 
below) proving that cooperation in the field of in-
frastructure is already established and that the im-
plementation of the connectivity and infrastructure 
agreement is progressing. 
In connection with the SPA the EU also created 
a special support facility to assist EU-Japan co-
operation in various areas. During last year they 
conducted a series of nine webinars with Europe-
an and Japanese experts on COVID-19 exploring 
various themes such as green recovery, business, 
and digitalisation and culminating with a webinar 
on connectivity. EU has taken a rather structural 
approach to find out where and how EU-Japan co-
operation can be implemented. An EU-Japan Joint 
Study on Connectivity Cooperation is now being 
undertaken. The first objective of this study is to 
identify flagship projects, sectors and countries 
in the regions of the Western Balkans, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. A second objective is to 
promote private investment and facilitate financ-
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ing of sustainable connectivity including possible 
joint projects with the engagement of the private 
sector. Three EU and three Japanese experts 
have been commissioned to conduct the study.
Starting with one of the focus areas Japan’s Prime 
Minister Abe announced the ‘Western Balkans 
(WB) Cooperation Initiative’ in January 2018, to 
support socio-economic reforms and facilitate 
ethnic reconciliation there. An EU WB strategy 
was also announced in 2018 to reinforce coop-
eration, addressing the specific challenges the 
WB faces, in particular, the need for fundamen-
tal reforms and good neighbourly relations. The 
EU’s  credible enlargement perspective  requires 
sustained efforts and irreversible reforms. These 
two initiatives were partly a response to the Chi-
nese – Central and Eastern (CEE) initiative (the 
17+1) in which China has set up a special fund of 
10 billion euros to increase trade and investment 
with the WB.6 
Three countries, namely Serbia, Bosnia and Alba-
nia, have been targeted for further studies of local 
needs; the EU and Japan have existing projects 
and projects in the pipeline, backed by financial 
resources. Interviews have already been held with 
EU and Japanese stakeholders such as director-
ates, ministries, financial institutions, and busi-
nesses. Most of these have been conducted over 
the web due to COVID 19. The original aim was 
to send out a mutual EU-Japan mission to gather 
research on local needs and create a field report, 
but COVID 19 prevented that. In April 2021 local 
experts conducted interviews instead to assess 
local needs.
In Eastern Europe (EE) the EU-Japanese expert 
team will focus on Azerbaijan as well as Ukraine. 
Of importance here is implementing power gen-
eration and road repair rather than digital and hu-
man connectivity. Business interests are substan-
tial in Azerbaijan and the aim is to provide private 
capital. Ukraine is the largest country in the region 
with strategic importance and a long border with 
the EU. This country would offer the biggest possi-
bilities for public and private connectivity projects. 
As in the WB, local needs were mapped in April. 
To find so called blue-sky projects of joint EU-Ja-
pan connectivity cooperation with a high poten-
tial impact is another aim of the joint study team. 
Here Ukraine might be an optimal focus country. 
In Central Asia (CA) the EU-Japanese Study team 
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will focus on Uzbekistan where the potential for 
public and private projects is considered large. 
The ambassadors in these countries have been 
asked to support the study. Its final report will be 
finished in May 2021. Because the view of the 
local needs, which is extremely important, is still 
missing due to the difficulties of travelling due to 
Covid19, it is very hard to pinpoint where and what 
kind of cooperation on connectivity EU and Japan 
would want to promote at this stage. Some reflec-
tions of what has been learnt so far are available. 
Even if specific countries are selected, the EU in 
general wants a regional approach while Japan 
seems more interested in concrete projects. The 
two have very different rules for procurement and 
this makes it difficult to cooperate on bigger proj-
ects in the transport and energy sector, even if 
both sides in principle are interested in coopera-
tion. Regulation will also determine how concrete 
project proposals can be. According to EU sourc-
es, the Japanese side has a more nationalistic 
approach, which does not promote cooperation. 
One way of resolving this might be to split projects 
into parts where the regions would each finance 
one part. Another way of resolving this would be to 
create a new fund with new rules that promote co-
operation. The EU side, on the other hand, can be 
very split, with different member countries wanting 
different things, making consensus difficult. Minor 
and less fancy projects like road rehabilitation and 
weighting equipment for trucks provide an easier 
focus for cooperation. Another area for collabora-
tion would be mutual road shows and business 
events.
In the digital field, which, after COVID 19, has 
gained further importance, the focus is often the 
treatment of data, privacy issues, regulations, and 
what needs to be done so that some of the coun-
tries can enter into existing frameworks. Artificial 
Intelligence is also being studied. In the field of 
people-to-people cooperation there is more flex-
ibility and less money involved. Here it could be 
possible to find quite visible projects in the fields 
of education, research and innovation, culture and 
sport, for instance. These are easy picks for show-
casing EU-Japan connectivity cooperation. Anoth-
er geographical area that EU-Japan cooperation 
on quality infrastructure can target is India, where 
the EU is planning for a new connectivity agree-
ment from May.
On February 26, 2021, during the third meeting 
of the Joint Committee under the EU-Japan SPA 
(which was held virtually), ‘the Partnership on 
Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastruc-
ture between Japan and the EU’ was discussed. 
Japan and the EU shared the view to continue en-
hancing cooperation in such fields as multilateral-
ism, sustainable connectivity, quality infrastructure 
and global issues, including climate change and 
other environmental issues as well as security pol-
icy. The EU and Japan affirmed their commitment 
to strengthen multilateralism, democracy and the 
rules-based international order. They underscored 
their efforts to protect lives and mitigate the so-
cial and economic consequences of the COVID 
19 pandemic, as well as to contribute as close-
ly-aligned partners to global public policy in key 
fora such as the G7, G20 and the United Nations 
system. The EU and Japan exchanged views on 
their respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific re-
gion. This included a discussion on the ongoing 
implementation of the EU-Japan Partnership on 
Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastruc-
ture there. 
What is clear from the above is that EU and Ja-
pan are currently taking a systematic approach to 
implement the Partnership. They are conducting 
mutual hearings on the needs in third countries 
and turning over a number of stones to find mutual 
cooperation projects in the fields of connectivity 
and infrastructure. COVID-19 has, to a certain ex-
tent, slowed the process, but it has also afforded 
an opportunity for the EU and Japan to increase 
cooperation as old structures change. Both re-
gions are determined to rebuild more sustainable, 
inclusive and resilient economies and societies. 
The EU’s Green Deal and Japan’s commitment 
to carbon neutrality by 2050 offer promising new 
opportunities for a stronger alliance for coopera-
tion on climate change and other environmental 
issues. In these very turbulent times people are 
ready and actually expecting a change. Health 
has become a top issue and COVID 19 has made 
it obvious that multilateral solutions are needed. 
Sustainable connectivity built on Japanese and 
EU shared norms and standard settings can be 
used to create a better world. 
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Proposals for Further Cooperation in 
Connectivity and Infrastructure
• Listen to the needs of developing countries 
and select a few flagship projects that the EU 
and Japan cooperate on. Be sure to make 
these visible to the world. It could be carbon 
neutral power plants, electric buses, windmills 
or solar energy parks. Why not let nurses or 
military medical personnel provide Covid vac-
cine stations and, with their flags raised, offer 
free vaccinations to poor people.
• COVID 19 has forced governments to pro-
vide huge extra budgets. Financial resources 
are available. This is not ODA money only, 
but also finance from loans for public-private 
cooperation in various fields of infrastructure 
development. Different rules and regulations 
should not be allowed to prevent co-financing 
of EU-Japan projects. Unconventional finan-
cial solutions should be found. Divide projects 
or create new mutual funds if necessary.
• Source private companies interested in co-
operation and create incentives for them to 
do so. Why not make a competition for ‘The 
EU-Japan cooperation project of the year’? 
Winners should be awarded and made visible.
• Work on media. Organise mutual study tours 
to cooperation projects.
• Rely on civil society to a much larger extent, 
especially when it comes to human connectiv-
ity. Many people are eager to assist in protect-
ing biodiversity, for example. Let JICA and DG 
INTPA7 create projects where civil society can 
participate. 
• Use the internet and create various pro-
grammes where EU and Japanese people can 
connect. Create special ones with sustainabili-
ty education for schoolchildren. Let them learn 
solutions from each other.
This list of proposals should be made much longer. 
The EU and Japan have the knowledge, education 
and experience as well as economic resources to 
play centre stage and make a strong contribution 
to a sustainable world order. Connectivity is the 
7  The Commission's Directorate-General for International Partnerships is responsible for formulating the EU’s international partnership and 
development policy, with the ultimate goal to reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development, and promote democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law across the world. On 16 January 2021, the Directorate General (DG) International Cooperation and Development 
(DEVECO) officially became DG International Partnerships (INTPA). This new name, together with its mission statement and structure, 
underlines the importance of the role of international partnerships in positioning the European Union (EU) in the world as a development 
actor working towards the eradication of poverty, the achievement of sustainable development objectives and the promotion of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law.
glue that can drive the process forward. Success 
will depend on the broadmindedness of the peo-
ple involved, as well as the will of politicians to 
implement unconventional ideas. 
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BOX. 1 Cooperation on Sustainable 
Connectivity and Quality 
Infrastructure8
In Southeast Asia’s Mekong region both Japan 
and the EU support water resource management 
and sustainable development of the Mekong Riv-
er as Development Partners of the Mekong Riv-
er Commission (MRC), and provide funding pro-
grammes for the Lower Mekong Region. Both 
Japan and the EU support ASEAN in the area of 
disaster management by providing funds to the 
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian As-
sistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). 
Both sides also work on enhancing the capacity 
building of the regional ASEAN-Emergency Re-
sponse and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT). 
In the Pacific region they support maritime re-
sources management, waste management and 
sustainable energy. The EU established the Mari-
time Technology Cooperation Centre (MTCC-Pa-
cific) and Japan will dispatch a regional advisor 
for port operation, maintenance and policy to the 
MTCC-Pacific. The EU established the Pacific-Eu-
ropean Union Marine Partnership Programme, 
and Japan implements the Capacity Enhance-
ment Project for the Sustainable Development 
and Sound Management in Fisheries. The EU fi-
nances the Pacific-EU Waste Management Pro-
gramme (PacWaste Plus), and Japan conducts 
technical cooperation on the Promotion of Region-
al Initiative on Solid Waste Management in Pacif-
ic Island Countries. Both programmes support 
the implementation of the Cleaner Pacific 2025 
Strategy by the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (SPREP). Japan imple-
ments the Project for the Introduction of Hybrid 
Power Generation System in the Pacific Island 
Countries, and the EU implements the European 
Union-Pacific Technical and Vocational Training 
on Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Ad-
aptation. In Central Asia both Japan and the EU 
support the border management between Afghan-
istan and Tajikistan. At a border crossing point in 
Dehkonkhona, the facilities are funded by the EU 
on the Afghan side and by Japan on the Tajik side. 
Japan and the EU contribute to infrastructure de-
velopment in Africa in line with the Programme 
for Infrastructure Development for Africa (PIDA) 
2021-2030. In Mozambique they support the 
road construction of the Nacala Corridor and co-fi-
nance the rehabilitation of the Nampula-Cuamba 
8  Japan-EU Development Cooperation, Factsheet made by Japan (MOFA) and DG INTPA on Feb 5 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100146628.
pdf
Road. In Burkina Faso they support the Burkina 
Faso-Niger Corridor Road Rehabilitation Proj-
ect. Japan and the EU fund various projects in 
the West Africa Growth Ring Corridor Master 
Plan. They also support the improvement of the 
Abidjan-Lagos Corridor (one of the major target 
corridors of the West Africa Growth Ring Master 
Plan), as well as market integration and enhanc-
ing customs administration capacity in the region, 
including Cote d’Ivoire. In Uganda they support 
the improvement of the Northern Corridor, which 
connects Uganda with Kenya and Rwanda. Japan 
supports the enhancement of power transmission 
and distribution capacity through the improvement 
of electricity transmission grids in Kampala, while 
the EU supports the development of a hydroelec-
tric facility and construction of transmission lines 
in Bujagali.
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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 
1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disci-
plinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process 
of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st 
century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral pro-
gramme and hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in 
addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously 
evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the ex-
panding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s 
neighbourhood and the wider world.
The Global Governance Programme 
The Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. 
It provides a European setting to conduct research at the highest level 
and promote synergies between the worlds of research and policy-making, 
to generate ideas and identify creative an innovative solutions to global 
challenges. The Programme is part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Ad-
vanced Studies of the European University Institute, a world-reknowned 
academic institution.  It receives financial support from the European Com-
mission through the European Union budget. Complete information on our 
activities can be found online at:  globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu
www.eui/rsc
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